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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE LINCHPIN ISSUE*
G. Sidney Buchanan**
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Peter and the apostles were brought before "the council and
all the senate of Israel," some members of the council "were enraged
and wanted to kill them" because the apostles had been "teaching the
people" in the name of Jesus contrary to an earlier charge of the council. 1 "But a Pharisee in the council named Gamaliel" opposed this
course of action, saying:
[I]n the present case I tell you, keep away from these men and let them
alone; for if this plan or this undertaking is of men, it will fail; but if it is
of God, you will not be able to overthrow them. You might even be
found opposing God!2
Scripture then records that the members of the council "took [Gamaliel's] advice, and when they had called in the apostles, they . . .
charged them not to speak in the name of Jesus, and let them go." 3
In the spirit of Gamaliel's advice, this article urges that the courts
"keep away" from the political process as it grapples with the issue of
same-sex marriage. From a Judeo-Christian perspective,4 if same-sex
marriage "is of men, it will fail; but if it is of God," same-sex marriage
will, in due course of time, take root and thrive in the social fabric of
the nation. Here, if ever, is the place for the courts to take special note
of the values promoted by the majority rule principle in our representative form of government" and of the majority's strong interest in seek* This article is a modified version of chapter five of the author's book, Morality, Sex, and
the Constitution. A Christian Perspective on the Power of Government to Regulate Private
Sexual Conduct between Consenting Adults (copyright 1985, University Press of America, Inc.).
** Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Princeton University (1956);
J.D., University of Michigan (1959). Member, Texas Bar.
I. Acts 5:21, 25 & 33 (all biblical references and quotations in this article are to the Revised Standard Version).
2. Id. 5:34, 38-39.
3. Id. 5:40.
4. In relation to any discussion of homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage, one cannot
talk about the moral norms of society without an examination of the main source of those norms.
In American society, that "main source" is the Judeo-Christian heritage as reflected primarily in
Jewish and Christian scripture, and in the modern pronouncements of the major branches and
denominations of Judaism and Christianity. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
Throughout this article, therefore, I weave into my discussion and analysis what I believe to be
relevant insights from the Judeo-Christian tradition.
5. See supra text accompanying notes 44-65.
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ing to promote its own perception of moral excellence through the legal
system. 6 On the issue of same-sex marriage, the political process should
be allowed to work its will without having the issue preempted by judicial intervention.
Conceptually, this article argues that state governments have no
constitutional obligation to recognize same-sex marriage, that state

governments may, at their constitutional option, limit the institution of
marriage to opposite-sex unions. This discussion proceeds on two conceptual assumptions: (1) The right of privacy includes an adult person's
decision to engage privately in sexual conduct with another consenting
adult;7 and (2) state governments have a "compelling" interest in protecting and fostering the marriage institution.' Conceding that governmental action limiting marriage to opposite-sex unions does impinge

6. See supra text accompanying notes 66-85.
7. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), points in the opposite
direction. In Doe, the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge federal court's dismissal of a challenge by male homosexuals to Virginia's sodomy law. A recent decision of the D.C. Circuit also
refused to find a constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (1984). As the sharply divided opinions appended to the denial of rehearing en banc indicate, however, a conclusion that the right of
privacy does not apply is by no means certain.
8. The marriage relationship promotes certain individual and community values. It is perhaps impossible to list all the individual values promoted by the marriage relationship, but five
such values come readily to mind: (I) generosity or the spirit of sacrificial giving; (2) fidelity or
the honoring of commitments; (3) integrity or the creation of trust; (4) self-respect or the assurance of personal worth;, (5) sustained joy. These individual values acquire added significance for
society because individual and community values are interrelated. Persons who practice and experience generosity, fidelity, integrity, self-respect, and sustained joy in the marriage relationship are
more apt to practice and experience those values in the larger reaches of life. Society benefits from
a process of value-infusion whereby those individual values nurtured in the marital relationship
are transmitted into the broader community.
In addition, certain identifiable community values are promoted by the marriage relationship.
In an admirable article, Professor Bruce C. Hafen advances persuasively four community values
that he believes are promoted by the formal marital relationship. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REv. 463, 471-91 (1983). These values, he contends, "are ... related to the political
ends of democracy, because it is primarily through family bonds that both children and parents
learn the attitudes and skills that sustain an open society." Id. at 472. Hafen discusses his community values under the following headings: (I) the needs of children; (2) socialization and public
virtue: obedience to the unenforceable; (3) the family in the democratic structure; and (4) marriage and minority status (in the age sense) as sources of objective jurisprudence. Id. at 473, 476,
479, 484. While it is beyond the scope of this article to set forth an extended analysis of Hafen's
values, I believe that, in combination with the individual values set forth above, these values are
sufficiently weighty to justify a conclusion that government has a compelling interest in their advancement. To characterize as less than compelling the societal interest in protecting and fostering
the institution of marriage would demean a relationship described by Justice Douglas as, "an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects ... an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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significantly on the right of privacy of those seeking a same-sex marriage,' the article contends, nevertheless, that such governmental action
is a means "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake"'°-that such action is the least "drastic means"'" of advancing the state's compelling interest in protecting and fostering the
marriage institution. If this analysis were adopted by the courts, the

governmental action would pass constitutional muster under the strict

scrutiny level of judicial review and would represent one of the few

areas in constitutional law where such review is "strict in theory" but
' 2
not "fatal in fact."'
Several additional conceptual points should be noted. This article

does not concern the power of government to subject same-sex conduct
(or, more generally, sexual conduct outside of marriage) to criminal
punishment.' 3 Nor does this article urge that government be constitutionally prohibited from recognizing same-sex marriage if it chooses to
do so. It argues simply that this choice, in constitutional terms, be left
to the nonjudicial branches of government, to the free workings of the
political process.

9. As stressed by Kenneth Karst,
[w]e have seen how the act and state of marriage are statements of identity and of identification with one's partner. This phenomenon feeds on itself; if large numbers of people
equate marriage and commitment, then each successive marriage is apt to seem to the
marrying couple both the symbol of commitment and the undertaking itself. The notion of
marriage as a contract, long embedded in law and popular culture, conveys this dual
meaning.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 670 (1980). Thus, a prohibition
of same-sex marriage does preclude same-sex couples from making the "statements of identity and
of identification with one's partner" that Karst describes.
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
II. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
12. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that such areas do exist. In certain
cases involving governmental regulation of access to the political process or the free exercise of
religion, the Court, while applying strict scrutiny review, has upheld the challenged governmental
action. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); American Party v. White, 415 U.S.
767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). More
recently, in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court reaffirmed its
position that "[tihe state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." Id. at 603 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at
257-58). In Bob Jones, the Court held that the government's "fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education ... substantially outweighs whatever burden denial
of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs." Id. at 604.
13. In this article, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, all references to "sexual
conduct" mean noncommercial, private sexual conduct between consenting adults. Elsewhere I
have taken the position that the right of privacy should be held to protect such conduct against
criminal prosecution when engaged in by two unmarried persons. See chapter four of G.
BUCHANAN, MORALITY. SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE POWER
OF GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE

PRIVATE SEXUAL

(copyright 1985, University Press of American, Inc.).
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Much is at stake in the resolution of the same-sex marriage issue.
If the courts impose on government a constitutional obligation to recognize same-sex marriage, this obligation would have important ramifications for all civil-law distinctions made by government between samesex and opposite-sex conduct. This would be especially true in the areas
of child custody and adoption proceedings.1 4 If government may not
distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex conduct in the area of
marriage, it is difficult to use the societal interest in protecting and
fostering the marriage institution as a basis for justifying that distinction in other areas of the civil law. In this sense, therefore, the samesex marriage issue is a linchpin issue. If it is resolved against the power
of government to limit marriage to opposite-sex unions, against the
power of government to confine marriage to its traditional opposite-sex
moorings, then the legal system, as a practical matter, will have lost its
capacity to make distinctions between same-sex and opposite-sex conduct in any walk of life. Government would be constitutionally
straitjacketed into a requirement of total equality in the regulation of
same-sex and opposite-sex conduct. Some might applaud that result,
while others would oppose it vehemently. Whatever may be a person's
position on the issue of same-sex marriage and the obligation of government to recognize it, it is crucially important to appreciate the legal
consequences that flow from the issue's resolution. With so much riding
on the outcome, it may be well, in this area of constitutional law, for
the courts to heed Justice Harlan's advice that they should not proceed
with "precipitate and insecure strides''15 in imposing new constitutional
obligations on the political process.

II.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

The current status of the law on the same-sex marriage issue may
be simply stated. From a legislative viewpoint, "[n]o state today would
knowingly issue a marriage license to a homosexual couple."1 " Moreover, no state statute expressly affirms the right of homosexual couples
14. In Comment, Homosexual's Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative
Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979), the comment authors, while urging that homosexuals
"should ... be afforded the opportunity to obtain the legal status and marital benefits to which
they are entitled," concede that the state should not "ordinarily" be required to permit homosexuals to adopt "absent a biological relationship (between the adopted child and] one member of the
homosexual union." Id. at 213, 215. The comment's difficulty with the adoption issue stems directly from its conclusion that government should be required to recognize some form of same-sex
marriage. See id. at 215-16.
dissenting). While
15. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 478 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
I disagree strongly with Justice Harlan's criticism as applied to the racial discrimination issue
before the Court in that case, the quoted words do reflect my attitude concerning the caution with
which I believe the courts should proceed on the same-sex marriage issue.
16. Hafen, supra note 8, at 465 n.6.
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to marry. 17 From a judicial viewpoint, "[tihe judiciary has unanimously inferred prohibitions of same-sex marriage from silent state
statutes,"' 18 and all courts "faced with [the same-sex marriage] issue
have relied on the premise that a lawful marriage, by definition, can be
entered into only by two persons of opposite sex. No court has taken
the position that state prohibition of homosexual marriage is
unconstitutional .,19
21
In two major decisions, Baker v. Nelson20 and Singer v. Hara,
state courts have addressed the constitutional issues involved in "state
prohibition of homosexual marriage" and in each case concluded that
the failure of the state to issue a marriage license to a homosexual
couple did not deprive the couple "of a fundamental right" nor subject
the couple to "irrational or invidious discrimination."2 More precisely,
the Singer court held that the restriction of marriage to heterosexual
couples was not a gender-based classification demanding an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.2 3 Nor, held the court, did the restriction
impinge on the fundamental right to marry because marriage refers to
an opposite-sex union.24 Hence, the strict scrutiny doctrine was inapplicable, and the Singer court employed a low level of scrutiny in which
the restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples was justified as
bearing a rational relationship to the policy of "affording a favorable
environment for the growth of children."2 5
Finally, it should be stressed that the United States Supreme
Court has not directly confronted the same-sex marriage issue. In
Baker v. Nelson,2" the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a constitu-

17. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REv. 311,
324-25 (1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Rivera, Recent Developments]; Rivera, Our StraightLaced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Personsin the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
799, 874-78 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rivera, Legal Position].
18. Comment, supra note 14, at 196.
19. Id. at 194.
20. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
21. II Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
22. Comment, supra note 14, at 196.
23. Singer, II Wash. App. at
-, 522 P.2d at 1192. In cases involving gender-based
classifications, the United States Supreme Court has held that such classifications, to withstand
constitutional challenge, "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See
also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
24. Singer, II Wash. App. at , 522 P.2d at 1195.
25. Id. at 522 P.2d at 1197. In this article, I will take a different conceptual route to
the same result reached by the Singer court. While conceding that nonrecognition of same-sex
marriage does infringe significantly on the right to privacy of same-sex couples, I will argue that
such a ban is narrowly drawn to promote the compelling governmental interest in protecting and
fostering the institution of marriage in its traditional opposite-sex form.
26. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185.
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tional challenge to Minnesota's restriction of marriage to heterosexual
couples.2 7 An appeal of that decision to the United States Supreme
28
Court was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. The
29
weight to be given that dismissal remains uncertain, and the same-sex
marriage issue awaits further elucidation by the Supreme Court.

III.

THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN HERITAGE

To define a heritage is not an easy task when talking about something as broad and amorphous as the Judeo-Christian heritage. To
bring some specificity to the notion of the Judeo-Christian tradition in
American society today, this section will focus on two aspects of that
heritage: (1) the Judeo-Christian tradition as reflected in Scripture;
and (2) that same heritage as reflected in the current pronouncements
of the major American branches and denominations of Judaism and
Christianity.3 Each of these heritage aspects will be examined in relation to the issue of same-sex marriage.
A.

Scripture and Current Denominational Pronouncements

From the book of Genesis forward, the Bible affirms the moral
rightness of opposite-sex marriage and of sexual conduct within the
framework of opposite-sex marriage) To those scriptural affirmations
could be added the many biblical stories in which the marriage of man
32
and woman is cast in a favorable and approving light. Not the least of

, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
27. Id. at 28. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810.
29. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist would probably disagree on the meaning of the Court's
summary dismissal in Nelson as they have concerning the Supreme Court's summary affirmance
in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977), Justice Brennan observed that "the Court has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating
[private consensual sexual] behavior among adults." Id. at 694 n.17. Justice Rehnquist replied:
"While we have not ruled on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct the facial constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively' established." Id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Doe).
30. Admittedly, this focus omits other relevant components of the Judeo-Christian heritage,
e.g., the opinions of modern religious leaders and scholars.
31. "Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they
become one flesh." Genesis 2:24.
And Pharisees came up to [Jesus] and tested him by asking, "Is it lawful to divorce one's
wife for any cause?" He answered, "Have you not read that he who made them from the
beginning made them male and female, and said 'For this reason a man shall leave his
father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh?' So they
are no longer two but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not man put
asunder.
Matthew 19:3-6. See also I Corinthians 7:3-4.
32. The marriages of Abraham and Sarah, Genesis 12-23, Isaac and Rebecca, id. 24-25,
Jacob and Rachel, id. 29-35, and Ruth and Boaz, Ruth 4, are obvious Old Testament examples.
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these is the supportive presence of Jesus at the "marriage at Cana in
Galilee" where, at time of need, Scripture records that Jesus performed
the miracle of turning water into "good wine. '" Viewed in totality,
therefore, the Bible radiates a moral approval of opposite-sex marriage
and its accompanying sexual intimacies. Any other construction would
be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.
In sharp contrast, the Bible nowhere affirms the moral rightness of
same-sex marriage. No scriptural passage even approaches that position. Moreover, the Bible contains several express condemnations of homosexual conduct."' These condemnations are stated in absolute terms
and do not appear to turn on the question of whether persons engaging
in homosexual conduct are seeking a permanent relationship with each
other. The Bible's condemnation of homosexual conduct, combined
with the total absence of any scriptural language approving same-sex
marriage, creates an implied negation of same-sex marriage that is
equally as strong as the Bible's express affirmation of opposite-sex marriage. Again, it would require an act of constructional legerdemain to
reach any other conclusion.
The current pronouncements of the major branches and denominations of Judaism and Christianity are in accord with Scripture on the
issue of same-sex marriage. As does Scripture, these pronouncements
expressly condemn homosexual conduct and strongly affirm the moral
rightness of opposite-sex marriage and of sexual conduct within such a
marriage.3 5 Indeed, some of the pronouncements go further and expressly state that the church should not give its liturgical blessing to
same-sex marriage but, instead, should reject such unions as contrary
to God's will as expressed in Scripture. The Roman Catholic Church's
The marriages of Joseph and Mary, Matthew 1:18-25, and of Zechariah and Elizabeth, Luke
1:5-80, are equally obvious New Testament examples.
33. John 2:1-11.
34. E.g., Leviticus 20:13 ("If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have
committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them."); Romans
1:26-27 ("men likewise gave up natural relations with women and were consumed with passion
for one another, men committing shameless acts with men"); I Corinthians 6:9-10 ("neither the
immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will inherit the kingdom of God"); see also 1 Timothy 1:10. These
passages notwithstanding, one scholar has argued that the "New Testament takes no demonstrable position on homosexuality." J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA
TO THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 117 (1980).
35. See, e.g., BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH
GORDIS. LOVE AND SEX: A MODERN JEWISH PERSPECTIVE 98 (1978); NATIONAL
CATHOLIC

423 (1977); R.
CONFERENCE OF

BISHOPS, To Live in Jesus Christ: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life, in IV

PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 181 (1984);
REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH RELATIONS OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI
SYNOD

12 (1981).

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:3

1975 Declarationon Certain Questions ConcerningSexual Ethics provides a representative statement:
A distinction is drawn, and it seems with some reason, between
homosexuals whose tendency comes from a false education, from a lack
of normal sexual development, from habit, from bad example, or from
other similar causes, and is transitory or at least not incurable; and
homosexuals who are definitively such because of some kind of innate
instinct or a pathological constitution judged to be incurable.
In regard to this second category of subjects, some people conclude
that their tendency is so natural that it justifies in their case homosexual
relations within a sincere communion of life and love analogous to marriage, in so far as homosexuals feel incapable of enduring a solitary life.
In the pastoral field, these homosexuals must certainly be treated
with understanding and sustained in the hope of overcoming their personal difficulties and their inability to fit into society. Their culpability
will be judged with prudence. But no pastoral method can be employed
which would give moral justification to these acts on the grounds that
they would be consonant with the condition of such people. For according to. the objective moral order, homosexual relations are acts which
lack an essential and indispensable finality

disordered and can in no case be approved.

....

6

[and] are intrinsically

39
8
Declarations from Jewish,3 7 Episcopal, and Greek Orthodox groups
or leaders are in accord. Research reveals no pronouncement of a major
the moral rightness of
branch of Christianity or Judaism that affirms
40
marriage.
same-sex
of
homosexual conduct or

B.

Concluding Thoughts on the Judeo-ChristianHeritage

In relation to same-sex marriage, the message of the Judeo-Christian tradition, as expressed in Scripture and current denominational

36. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON CERTAIN
ON SEXQUESTIONS CONCERNING SEXUAL ETHICS 8-9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DECLARATION
UAL ETHICS].

E.g., R. GORDIS, supra note 35, at 155.
REPORT OF THE 1977 SPECIAL MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF BISHOPS OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH 41 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 EPISCOPAL REPORT].
39. The Church and Contemporary Moral Issues, 22 GREEK ORTHODOX THEOLOGICAL
REV. (1977) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
40. The Metropolitan Community Church, most of whose 27,000 parishioners are of homosexual orientation, teaches that homosexuality is "a gift from God" and conducts rites of "holy
union" for homosexual couples, as well as rites of "holy matrimony" for heterosexual couples.
TIME, May 23, 1983, at 58. More recently, the Unitarian Universalist Association, a liberal Protestant denomination, has approved homosexual unions. On June 28, 1984, 1,300 delegates representing the denomination's 175,000 members voted overwhelmingly by voice vote to affirm "the
growing practice of some of its ministers of conducting services of union of gay and lesbian
couples." Houston Chronicle, June 29, 1984, § I, at 2. It is too early to assess the impact of this
decision on "mainline" religious denominations.
37.

38.
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pronouncements, seems clear: The morality of opposite-sex marriage is
expressly affirmed; homosexual conduct is expressly condemned; and
same-sex marriage, expressly or by implication, is stated to be a relationship that is contrary to God's will and, therefore, not entitled to
receive the church's liturgical blessing. 41 One may disagree with the
Judeo-Christian heritage on any or all of these points. What I believe
one may not do and remain intellectually honest is to distort the meaning of the scriptural passages and church pronouncements cited in this
section into a position that is neutral toward, or even favorable to, homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage. What weight, if any, should
be given in constitutional adjudication to the position of the JudeoChristian heritage is a different and important question, a question on
which reasonable minds can differ. On the question of the meaning of
the sources cited in this section, it does not seem to me that reasonable
minds can differ to any significant degree. In relation to same-sex marriage, the position of the Judeo-Christian heritage should be dealt with
as it is and not as some would tendentiously like it to be.
IV.

NONRECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS A PERMISSIBLE
GOVERNMENTAL MEANS OF PROTECTING AND FOSTERING THE
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE

While it is difficult to articulate a nonfaith rationale for the distinction made by the Judeo-Christian heritage between same-sex and
opposite-sex marriage, the task is not impossible.'2 Accordingly, this
section will explicate a series of secular arguments that support the
refusal of government to recognize same-sex marriage, arguments that
would justify a court in holding that nonrecognition of same-sex marriage is a governmental means "narrowly drawn" in relation to government's compelling interest in protecting and fostering the marriage institution. Alternatively, these same arguments will serve to show why
government has a compelling interest in confining the institution of
marriage to its traditional opposite-sex framework. 43 For if that pro-

41. See supra text accompanying notes 30-40.
42. The task is mandated by establishment clause considerations. For constitutional law
purposes, it is not sufficient to justify government's nonrecognition of same-sex marriage by reference solely to religious beliefs and doctrine. A significant secular reason for the nonrecognition
must be found to avoid establishment of religion difficulties. In sustaining the validity of Sunday
closing laws against an establishment clause attack, for example, the United States Supreme
Court found that such laws had a secular purpose and effect. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 444 (1961). The Court identified that secular purpose as a desire by the state "to set one day
apart from all others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquility-a day which all members of the family and community have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together." Id. at 450.
43. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, all references in this section to "marriage" or the "marriage institution" mean marriage in its traditional opposite-sex form.
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position can be established, the means argument follows ineluctably. As
a means, the nonrecognition of same-sex marriage is more than narrowly drawn in relation to the government's interest in confining marriage to opposite-sex unions; it is a means that is indispensable to the
advancement of that interest.
A. Honoring the Values Promoted by the Majority Rule Principle in
Our Representative Form of Government
Perhaps in no generation other than our own have the rights of
individuals and of minor parties received greater solicitude in judicial
45
decisions"' and in the writings of legal scholars. This solicitude is par44. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court was
"required ... to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for
speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct." Id. at 256. The Court stated: "[W]e consider this
case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270.
The Court went on to hold that this "profound national commitment" requires "a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at
279-80.
In a similar vein, the Court, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), confronted facts in
which "Paul Robert Cohen was convicted . . . of violating that part of California Penal Code §
415 which prohibits 'maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood
or person . . . by ... offensive conduct.'" Id. at 16. Cohen had been observed in the corridor of
the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." In
reversing Cohen's conviction, the Court stressed the importance of
the constitutional backdrop against which our decision must be made. The constitutional
right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as
ours ....

To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only
verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established
limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of
open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal
cacophony is, in this sense, not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of
the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual
distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.
Id. at 24-25.
45. In describing "the function of noninterpretive review in human rights cases," Professor
Michael J. Perry states:
The function of noninterpretive review in human rights cases, then, is the elaboration and
enforcement by the Court of values, pertaining to human rights, not constitutionalized by
the framers; it is the function of deciding what rights, beyond those specified by the framers, individuals should and shall have against government.
M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 93 (1982). Because human
rights are so important and because the "stakes are very high indeed," id. at 92, Perry argues that
in human rights cases, the Court should not limit itself to "interpretive review"-review in which
the Court "ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice . . . by reference to a value
judgment embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in some particular provision of the
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ticularly evident in relation to the individual rights of freedom of
speech and religion protected by the first amendment," the individual
right of privacy now emerging under the Supreme Court's modern interpretation of substantive due process, 47 and in the heightened level of
judicial scrutiny applied by the Court to governmental action based on
racial and other minority group classifications.4 In these areas, individtext of the Constitution or in the overall structure of government ordained by the Constitution."
Id. at 10. Rather, Perry urges, the Court should protect individual rights through noninterpretive
review in which "it makes the determination of constitutionality by reference to a value
judgment
other than one constitutionalized by the framers." Id. at 11.
In adopting a position that falls somewhere between "a clause-bound interpretivism" and
"a
value-laden form of noninterpretivism," J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 89 n.*(1980),
Dean
John Hart Ely argues for an approach to constitutional adjudication that "is akin to what
might
be called an 'antitrust' as opposed to a 'regulatory' orientation to economic affairs-rather
than
dictate substantive results it intervenes only when the 'market,' in our case the political
market, is
systematically malfunctioning." Id. at 102-03. Ely stresses the special competence of
appointed
judges
objectively to assess claims-though no one could suppose the evaluation won't be full
of
judgment calls-that either by clogging the channels of change or by acting as accessories
to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests
of
those whom the system presupposes they are.
Id. at 103. This "representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review," id. at 181, would
have the
Court pursue an activist role in "clearing the channels of political change" and in "facilitating
the
representation of minorities." Id. at 105, 135.
Whatever may be their differences in the ongoing debate over the proper scope of noninterpretive judicial review, Perry and Ely are representative of the modern generation of legal
scholars
who attach great importance to the judicial protection of individual and minority group
rights. In
a similar spirit, Professor Jordan J. Paust argues that "an active judicial involvement
is necessary
to guarantee more fully, for all Americans, the human and constitutional right to human
dignity."
Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into
Criteria
and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 223 (1984). Finally, note the statement of Professor
Jesse H.
Choper that "the overriding virtue of and justification for vesting the [Supreme] Court with
[the]
awesome power [of judicial review] is to guard against governmental infringement of
individual
liberties secured by the Constitution." J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 64 (1980).
46. In addition to the Sullivan and Cohen cases cited in supra note 44, see Brandenburg
v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
47. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S.
557 (1969) (obscene material in home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)
(contraceptives).
48. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that disadvantaging racial classifications
are
"immediately suspect" and subject "to the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United
States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Typically, in
the words
of Professor Gunther, this rigid scrutiny requires government to show "both a 'compelling'
end
and a carefully tailored, 'necessary' means" to justify the classification that it has employed.
G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 750
n.3 (10th ed. 1980).
Other classifications, while not triggering "rigid" or "strict" scrutiny, have at least generated
an "intermediate" level of scrutiny. In the area of gender classifications; for example, the
Supreme
Court has held that such classifications, to withstand constitutional challenge, "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See also Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313,
316-17 (1977).
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ual and minority. group rights have received strong, even rhapsodic,
praise and support."9
This accentuated concern for individual and minority group rights
is in large part a healthy and welcome development on the American
political scene. In American history, overbearing majorities have indeed
50
oppressed the rights of the minor party. The majority's zealous desire
to advance its own interests through the political process does require
an equally zealous protection of individual and minority group rights.
This political truism, firmly embedded in the American constitutional
framework, becomes even more persuasive when individual rights are
1
viewed from a global perspective.
Should we not then rejoice in a society that seeks a vigorous protection of individual and minority group-rights? We should, subject to
a crucial caveat: In our rush to accord that protection, we should not
destroy the principle of majority rule as the operative norm in the
American political process. In our infatuation with individual and minority group rights, we are in danger of forgetting the importance of
the majority rule principle and the vital role that it plays in our society.
We are in danger of developing an attitude of distaste, suspicion, and
even hostility toward majority action per se, of viewing majority action
as a lower form of political action that is invariably the product of
2
unsophisticated thinking and selfish motivation. More fundamentally,

49. In addition to the statements quoted in supra notes 44-48, see Tinker, 393 U.S. at
508-09; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
50. The American slave system and the white majority's treatment of American Indians are
the examples that come readily to mind.
51. From a global perspective, it is clear that individual and minority group rights are today
being violated on a pervasive and ongoing basis. This violation stems typically from the action of
minority ruling classes wielding dictatorial power over those subject to their control. Examples
abound at both ends of the political spectrum: The treatment of Jews and political dissidents by
the ruling clique of the Soviet Union is an example of oppression on the left side of the political
spectrum, while the dictatorial regimes of Chile and Haiti are prime examples of oppression on
the right side of the political spectrum. More often than not, the violation of individual rights, as
in South Africa, extends beyond the deprivation of minority group rights to the broader deprivation of "majority group" rights. Indeed, it is the very nature of dictatorial regimes (whether of the
left or of the right) that, in order to perpetuate their power, they must engage in a continuing
violation of political rights on a wholesale basis.
52. Professor Perry, for example, states that, in the resolution of "certain political issues...
widely perceived to be fundamental moral issues as well," our "electorally accountable policymaking institutions are not well suited to deal with such issues in a way that is faithful to the notion of
moral evolution, or therefore, to our religious understanding of ourselves." M. PERRY, supra note
45, at 100. Perry's elaboration of this point can be boiled down to two statements: (I) Courts can
resolve "fundamental moral issues" more wisely than the legislative and executive branches of
government; and (2) the "established moral conventions of the greater part of . . . particular
[legislative] constituencies" do not promote "moral evolution" or "moral growth" as effectively as
moral conventions stemming from other sources, whatever those other sources may be. See id.
Other scholars share Perry's viewpoint. See, e.g., R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE
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we are in danger of confusing the excesses of majority rule with the
rule itself.
At this point then, it is well to recall the positive values that the
principle of majority rule is designed to promote in a representative
form of government. Foremost among those values is the role played by
the majority rule principle in preserving the very substance of representative government itself. Without the principle of majority rule, representative government would crumble. A casual glance at the American
political structure reveals the workings of the majority rule principle.
At every level of that structure, whether local, state, or national, legislative action depends for its efficacy upon the majority vote of one or
more representative bodies of government.53
The preservation role of the majority rule principle reaches still
more deeply. It is tied indissolubly to the preservation of free elections
in a representative form of government. By a free election is meant an
election in which: (1) the results of the election (including especially
the defeat of incumbents) will, realistically, be accepted and carried
out by those holding political power; (2) those who are voting are not,
realistically, subject to the control of those holding political power; and
(3) the qualifications and procedures for voting are fair and reasonable
in relation to the purposes of the election.54 While not perfect, this defi-

(1967). In analyzing the motives of the typical legislator, Dahl states:
[Congressional leaders] rely mainly on persuasion, party loyalty, expectations of reciprocal
treatment, and, occasionally, special inducements such as patronage or public works. But
none of these is likely to be adequate if a member is persuaded that a vote to support his
party will cost him votes among his constituents. Fortunately, for him, the mores of Congress, accepted by the leaders themselves, are perfectly clear on this point: His [or her]
own election comes first.
Id. at 131. See also Fiss, Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979) ("Legislators ... see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of
the people-what they want and what they believe should be done."); Traynor, The Limits of
Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. I, 8 (1977) ("Legislators have become astute at turning a
deaf ear to highly visible issues on which they do not want to gamble their political lives.").
From a historical perspective, it would be difficult to support Perry's thesis in the area of civil
rights. In the elimination of racial and other forms of class discrimination, one of the "fundamental moral issues" cited by Perry, the "morality" record of Congress has been no worse than, and
probably better than, the record of the Supreme Court. It was, after all, the Court's decisions in
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that
played a major role in vitiating the civil rights legislation enacted by Congress in the post-Civil
War period, and in blocking further progress in the civil rights movement for close to a century.
53. Of course, a bill originating in either house of Congress must first be approved by a
majority vote in both houses. Without such approval, the bill lacks legal efficacy and cannot be
presented to the president for consideration. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl.2.
54. The first requirement concerning acceptance of the election results includes "issue-oriented" elections as well as "candidate-oriented" elections. In the third requirement concerning
qualifications and procedures, I am setting forth a general guideline of fairness and
reasonableness.
UNITED STATES
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nition suffices to show the vital link between the preservation of free
elections and the majority rule principle.
Beyond its role in helping to preserve the very essence of a representative form of government, i.e., law-making power exercised by representatives chosen in free elections, the majority rule principle also
contributes strongly to the political stability of society. It does so by its
appeal to a rudimentary sense of fairness in both the governors and the
governed.5 5 If a group of persons is debating a course of action which,
when decided, is intended to bind all members of the group, the majority rule principle commends itself as generally the fairest means of determining what course of action the-group should take. Common sense
dictates to the normal person that group decision making is an inescapable fact of political life and that some procedural method for moving the group forward must be chosen. For that purpose, the majority
rule principle, in all but the rarest cases, radiates an appeal to elemental justice that no other procedural mechanism can match.
What is true of groups in which persons participate directly in the
decision-making process is also true of a representative form of government in which persons delegate decision-making authority to others
chosen by them in free elections. In the procedures both of electing
representatives and in the decision-making processes of the representatives themselves, the majority rule principle promotes political stability
by making the "losers" more willing to accept the choices and decisions
of the "winners." With the majority rule principle "alive and well" in a
representative form of government, the average citizen will more readily "buy into the system" and accept peacefully, even constructively,
those political decisions and choices with which the citizen disagrees.
Such a citizen will then56 be more willing to work for change within the
'system than outside it.

55. In chapter one of his book, Mere Christianity, C.S. Lewis argues that there is a rudimentary sense of fairness that is shared generally by all persons, a "law or Rule about Right and
Wrong" that "used to be called the Law of Nature":
This law was called the Law of Nature because people thought that every one knew it by
nature and did not need to be taught it. They did not mean, of course, that you might not
find an odd individual here and there who did not know it, just as you find a few people
who are colourblind or have no ear for a tune. But taking the race as a whole, they thought
that the human idea of decent behavior was obvious to every one. And I believe they were
right.
C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 18 (1960). The majority rule principle constitutes, I believe, a
fundamental rule of "decent behavior" in the sense described by Lewis.
56. In describing the values promoted by freedom of expression, Professor Thomas 1. Emerson states that, among other things, "[freedom of expression] is an essential mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and change." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 7 (1970). By its appeal to the citizen's "rudimentary sense of fairness," the majority
rule principle helps to preserve that same "balance between stability and change."
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Finally, the majority rule principle promotes "consensus politics"
and makes less likely the implementation of governmental policy that
has only a narrow base of public support. Definitionally, the majority
rule principle requires a broad base of public support for any governmental action that is sustained in character and significant in its impact upon the citizenry; without that support, such action will, sooner
or later, encounter political headwinds that require modification or
abandonment of the action in question. 57 The majority rule principle
thus fashions a crucial link between important governmental policy and
broad public support of that policy.
In so doing, the majority rule principle encourages greater citizen
participation in the political process. In a political system in which the
majority rule principle is the operative norm, minority factions must
appeal to a wider base of public support in order to achieve a majority
consensus that will move the system. 58 The building of that consensus
requires political persuasion-perhaps the most basic form of free
speech protected by the first amendment. 5 By making political persuasion.a practical requirement for "moving the system," the majority rule
principle helps to insure that freedom of speech will be exercised frequently and vigorously so that, in the words of Justice Brennan, "debate on public issues" will remain "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." 0 Seen in this light, the majority rule principle becomes, somewhat paradoxically, a guardian of individual rights, for individual
rights that are exercised vigorously are less likely to atrophy than those
that fall into desuetude.
Beyond this, consensus building generally promotes wiser political
decisions than those that are achieved through the rule of a dictatorial
minority. 61 By requiring an appeal to a broad base of political support,
57. This is precisely what happened with respect to our policy of military intervention in
Vietnam. As support for that policy eroded, the nation reached a point at which the government's
Vietnam policy was no longer supported by the "majority will." As a result, the policy of military
intervention was abandoned in favor of military withdrawal.
58. Emerson states that "freedom of expression is essential to provide for participation in
decision making by all members of society. This is particularly significant for political decisions."
T. EMERSON, supra note 56, at 7. With its requirement of consensus building, the majority rule
principle promotes the "participation" value that Emerson describes.
59. Alexander Meiklejohn has stressed that "public issue" speech is at the core of speech
protected by the first amendment and has urged that such speech should be wholly immune from
governmental regulation. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 106-07 (1948). Upon the unabridged freedom to engage in such
speech, he insists, "the
entire structure of our free institutions rests." Id. at 48.
60. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
61. If continued rule by a "philosopher-king" could be ensured, such a ruler might well
make wiser decisions than those made by a majority in a representative form of government. THE
REPUBLIC OF PLATO (F. Cornford ed. 1961). Plato contended that it is possible
to devise a political system that would generate a continuing procession of philosopher-kings as rulers. Id. at
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the majority rule principle mandates exposure by minority factions to
viewpoints other than their own. And, in the process of achieving a
majority consensus, the viewpoints of differing factions must be taken
into account and at least partially accommodated. Clearly, the fact
that governmental action commands majority support does not guarantee wise political decisions; majorities can blunder stupidly and act oppressively. But, in the long view of history, a governmental system that,
in its daily operation, requires a blending and accommodation of competing viewpoints across a wide spectrum of ideas is a better conduit
for political wisdom than any other.6 2 If political wisdom flows, at least
in part, from a vibrant pluralism in society,6 3 the majority rule principle, with its concomitant requirement of consensus building, is ideally
calculated to keep that pluralism alive.
To summarize, the majority rule principle in our representative
form of government preserves values such as political stability, the collective political wisdom that flows from the demands of compromise,
the stimulation of freedom of speech and association generated by the
requirement of consensus building, and the contribution of the majority
rule principle itself to the very preservation of representative government. For these values to thrive, courts must adopt a dominant stance

205-1I. In the recorded history of mankind, however, no such system has emerged. On this latter
point, note the famous observation of Judge Learned Hand: "For myself it would be most irksome
to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly
do not." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
62. Professor Paust makes this point persuasively:
If one is serious about the value and worth of each individual, then one must pay
serious attention to what each person actually expects and does and, thus, to what the
aggregate of people in a community actually expect and do. Human dignity requires recognition of the role of each individual as a participant in the processes of authority and in the
Patterns of generally shared legal expectations that are
formation of normative content ....
shaped by both majority and minority preferences, I would argue, are the most useful and
objective (even principled, but certainly not neutral) guides for a decisonmaker to follow if
one is concerned about democracy, human dignity, and a process of self-determination that
involves participation by each individual member of the community.
I would rather trust such a process on the whole than a jurisprudence that allowed
decisions merely on the basis of the preferences of official elites-elites who . . . often
confuse common interest with their own interests and prejudices. The actual social evils
and human atrocities that we seem most concerned about, moreover, are usually those that
have been caused or approved by minority-elites. Such atrocities rarely occur when the
people govern as equal individual participants, although official authority has been misused
in their name in numerous social systems.
Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understandingof Content, Authority, and Constitutional Choice, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 226, 286-87 (1980).
63. In his concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), Justice Brennan stressed the values of pluralism in these words: "Government may properly include religious
institutions among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each
group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous
pluralistic society." Id. at 689.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss3/4

1985]

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

of judicial self-restraint in relation to legislative action, a stance that
recognizes that "[c]ourts are not the only agency of government that
must be assumed to have capacity to govern." 4 As the primary instruments in our political system for reflection of the majority will, the
legislative branches of government should be allowed to function in a
largely unencumbered fashion if the values promoted by the majority
rule principle are to be fully realized. Admittedly, this is an argument
that applies generally to all legislative action. In the case of same-sex
marriage, the respect-for-majority-rule argument serves as a backdrop
to the more particularized arguments that follow. It is an argument
none the less fundamental for being general in its application and "is
not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this
' 5

subject."

B. The Majority's Aspirational Interest in Promoting Its Own Perception of Moral Excellence through the Legal System
In his book, The Morality of Law," Lon Fuller describes two moralities, the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty:
The morality of aspiration is most plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy. It is the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest
realization of human powers. In a morality of aspiration there may be
overtones of a notion approaching that of duty. But these overtones are
usually muted, as they are in Plato and Aristotle. Those thinkers recognized, of course, that a man might fail to realize his fullest capabilities.
As a citizen or as an official, he might be found wanting. But in such a
case he was condemned for failure, not for being recreant to duty; for
shortcoming, not for wrongdoing. Generally with the Greeks instead of
ideas of right and wrong, of moral claim and moral duty, we have rather
the conception of proper and fitting conduct, conduct such as beseems a
67
human being functioning at his best.

In contrasting language, Fuller continues:
Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom. It lays down the basic
rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an
ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its
mark. It is the morality of the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments. It speaks in terms of "thou shalt not," and, less frequently, of
"thou shalt." It does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportuni64. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
65. The quoted phrase was used in another context by Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion
for the Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
66. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
67. Id. at 5.
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ties for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns them
68
for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.

There is an obvious connection between lawmaking and Fuller's
morality of duty. 9 If a lawmaker believes that certain conduct does not
violate the morality of duty, there would normally be little reason for
legislating against such conduct, and for subjecting such conduct, by
law, to criminal or civil disabilities. Typically, the lawmaker would remit such conduct to the legally unregulated realms of morality of aspiration.7 0 If the lawmaker believes that the conduct in question does viOlate the morality of duty, he or she theft confronts a challenging
question of jurisprudence: To what extent should we legislate against
(civilly or criminally) conduct that we believe is immoral?7" In many
instances, there is no easy answer to this question, and it may well be
the most perplexing question that the conscientious lawmaker is required to face. 2 Implicitly or explicitly, it is a question that lies at the
core of much legislative debate and action.
What is not so obvious is the connection between lawmaking and
the morality of aspiration. While it may be true that there "is no way
by which the law can compel a man to live up to the excellences of

68. Id. at 5-6.
69. Fuller himself stresses that connection: "There is no way by which the law can compel a
man to live up to the excellences of which he is capable. For workable standards of judgment the
law must turn to its blood cousin, the morality of duty." Id. at 9.
70. Morality of aspiration concerns, however, may often cause government to encourage or
discourage certain conduct through the conditional appropriation technique or by offering a status,
e.g., employment position, to the public conditioned upon the status-holder's performance or nonperformance of certain conduct. Stated more tersely, government may often seek to induce that
which it cannot, or chooses not to, compel.
71. At the anticriminalization end of the spectrum is the "unkind" act. Most people would
characterize an unkind act as wrong or immoral, but few would contend that people should be
punished criminally for committing unkind acts. At the procriminalization end of the spectrum is
the case of murder. Nearly all would agree that murder is wrong or immoral, and nearly all would
agree that murder should be punished criminally. In the middle of the spectrum lie the more
difficult and borderline examples of abortion and the dissemination of pornography. In all of these
examples, we assume, for purposes of the jurisprudential question stated in the text, that the issue
of criminalization is being decided by a person who believes that the conduct in question is wrong
or immoral.
72. To illustrate this point, Fuller uses the example of "gambling for high stakes" and then
discusses the perplexities that confront a conscientious legislator both in deciding whether such
conduct is immoral and whether it should be legislated against. L. FULLER, supra note 66, at 6-9.
During the debate on the public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
United States Senators and Representatives faced this same jurisprudential question: How far
should congressional power be pressed in the elimination of racial and other forms of class discrimination in places of public accommodation? That such discrimination constituted a moral evil
was generally conceded, but the question of the proper use of congressional power in relation to
that evil was seriously debated. See selections from hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee in July and August of 1963 as excerpted in G. GUNTHER, supra note 48, at 199-203.
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which he is capable,""3 law can influence morality in two related ways.
First, through what it prohibits or compels, law can force a change in
the habits of the people, and the new habits, if persisted in over a period of time, can eventually become the new morality."' Here, a change
in moral attitude follows in the train of a legally compelled change in
conduct. Second, through what it permits or authorizes, law can help to
create a moral climate that is hospitable to certain forms of conduct
and hostile to other forms. It is in this second area that the connection
between lawmaking and the morality of aspiration principally lies.
What we aspire to achieve morally is influenced by what we permit legally. To a degree hard to calibrate, every retreat from the legal
prohibition of conduct enhances, in the eyes of society, the moral appeal of the conduct that is now permitted legally to occur. All other
things being equal, it is harder to condemn what the law permits than
what the law prohibits. 75 Hence, the majority may rightly believe that
legal recognition of conduct that it deems morally deficient undermines, to at least some extent, the capacity of the majority to achieve
the levels of moral excellence to which it aspires. The majority thus has
a natural and logical interest in not only opposing legislation that
threatens the moral climate that the majority wishes to preserve, but
also in supporting legislation that reinforces that climate. Because of
that interest, legislators representing the will of the majority do not
operate in a moral vacuum, nor can they fairly be expected to do so.
The majority's aspirational interest acquires. special force in the
area of same-sex marriage. There, opposite-sex marriage, the status
traditionally offered by government as the framework in which sexual
conduct may legally occur, is tied uniquely to the gender of those seeking to enter the relationship. This is not a status, such as a state highway engineer, in which a person's private sexual conduct may be fairly
said to bear no rational relationship to the person's fitness for the function that he or she seeks to discharge. In the case of opposite-sex marriage, the private sexual conduct of the marriage participants is not

73. L. FULLER, supra note 66, at 9.
74. An example of which I am personally aware illustrates this capacity of law to shape a
new morality by compelling a change in habit. In 1968, I was talking with a man who had, in
1964, opposed passage of the public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. His
opposition in 1964 was based on what he then believed to be the legal and moral right of a
restaurant owner to discriminate racially in the choice of his or her customers. In 1968, almost as
a passing remark, he said to me: "I think it's right that a black can eat in a restaurant without
being discriminated against." His perception of morality had clearly been affected by the change
in habit wrought by the 1964 Act.
75. The debate over legalization of the use and possession of marijuana must confront that
jurisprudential reality. If the use and possession of marijuana is legalized, it becomes more difficult for society to maintain a position of moral opposition to that conduct.
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peripheral; it is normally an intimate and vital part of the relationship
and goes to the heart of the relationship's ability to function successfully. Definitionally, two persons of the same sex are not fit for the
function of participating in opposite-sex marriage. Making them fit for
the function of marriage would require a fundamental change in the
legal definition of marriage, a dramatic revision of the concept of marriage as it has been traditionally understood by society. The majority
may reasonably believe that a fundamental change in the-legal defini76
tion of an institution "older than the Bill of Rights" has a significant
capacity to threaten the standards of morality that the majority wishes
to preserve in relation to that institution.
In secular terms, the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is
akin to the church's liturgical blessing of same-sex unions. It is a highly
77
visible statement of approval by the legal system. Moreover, it occurs
with reference to a status that cannot function without that approval. It
is one thing for society to determine that particular conduct should not
be subject to criminal regulation. Much occurs in society that the majority may believe is morally wrong but that the majority may determine, for various policy reasons, should not be made a crime. Admittedly, even that determination may have some limited capacity to
elevate the moral appeal of the legally tolerated conduct in the eyes of
society. This "moral elevation" phenomenon, however, becomes more
pronounced when the legal system moves beyond toleration on the
criminal side to affirmative approval on the civil side. Refraining from
breaking into the-private bedrooms of same-sex couples for purposes of
criminal prosecution has little realistic capacity to threaten the moral
foundations of opposite-sex marriage. By way of contrast, to broaden
the governmentally created status of marriage to include same-sex unions is an affirmative statement of legal approval that places same-sex
unions on a plane of total legal equality with opposite-sex unions.
Clearly, the majority may reasonably infer that this latter action has a
substantially greater capacity than decriminalization to enhance the
moral appeal of same-sex marriage in the eyes of society.
The "visibility factor" mentioned in the preceding paragraph

76. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
77. In rejecting church recognition of same-sex marriage, the 1977 Special Meeting of Episcopal Bishops stated:
The Church . . . is right to confine its nuptial blessing exclusively to heterosexual marriage.
Homosexual unions witness to incompleteness. For the Church to institutionalize by liturgical action a relationship that violates its own teaching about sex is inadmissable [sic].
The Church's liturgical action is corporate. It is also public. It witnesses to what the
Church stands for and to what it advocates as good for society as a whole.
1977 EPIsCOPAl. REPORT, supra note 38, at 41. Cf DECLARATION ON SEXUAL ETHICs, supra note
36, at 8-9.
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needs further explication. When same-sex couples are engaging in
nonadulterous conduct in the privacy of their bedroom, we should, as
argued by Professor Bickel in relation to the bedroom reading of obscenity, "protect [their] privacy.178 Constitutionally speaking, we
should be required to let them alone, to hold that their conduct is protected by the right of privacy against criminal prosecution. 71 When,
however, their relationship receives the affirmative legal approval of
government under the name of marriage, the nature of their relationship, again in Bickel's works, "intrudes upon us all, want it or not." 80
Under the trappings of that approval, participants in same-sex marriage would be able to project their relationship into the daily aspects
of public life, its commercial, recreational, and entertainment centers,
with substantially the same force and visibility as participants in opposite-sex marriage. That this reality would have some tendency to enhance the moral appeal of same-sex marriage in the eyes of society
seems obvious even though, in advance of the legal recognition of samesex marriage, the degree of enhancement would be difficult to substantiate empirically. We may say with Chief Justice Taft, speaking in a
different context: "All others can see and understand this. How can we
properly shut our minds to it?" 1
In a different area of constitutional law, Justice Stevens has
stressed the wisdom of respecting the majority's morality of aspiration.
In Runyon v. McCrary,8" the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by
Justice Stewart, adopted a broad construction of a civil rights statute
enacted by Congress in the immediate post-Civil War period." Concurring separately, Justice Stevens stated that, if the case were one of first
impression, he would have construed the statute more narrowly. He
noted, however, that the Court had recently placed a similarly broad
construction on a companion statute to the one before the Court in
Runyon. Accordingly, Stevens reasoned that a narrow construction of
the present statute "would be a significant step backwards" and "contrary to my understanding of the mores of today" in the area of race

78. Bickel, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 25, 26.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 7 & 13.
80. Bickel, supra note 78, at 26.
81. Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
82. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
83. The statute before the Runyon Court was originally enacted in 1866 and in its present
form provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens .... 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). The Court construed § 1981 to prohibit "private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because
they are Negroes." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160, 168, 173-75.
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relations."a The sensitivity shown by Stevens to "the mores of today" in
the area of race relations should be shown by the courts to the mores of
today in the area of same-sex marriage.
There is an independent value that flows from respecting the majority's morality of aspiration. Generally, society benefits from a vital
desire on the part of the majority to realize its own perception of moral
excellence. Conversely, society suffers when the majority is indifferent
to that goal. Accordingly, the majority should be encouraged to promote its own perception of moral excellence through all the mediating
structures of society. And among those mediating structures is, of
course, the legal system itself. Here, the majority needs to know that
the legal system, and especially the legislative process, may be used to
promote the standards of morality to which the majority aspires. Without that assurance, the zeal to achieve moral excellence slackens, and
the task of promoting moral excellence may fall into hands less friendly
to the interests of society.8 5 For, with all its imperfections and tendencies to excess, the majority will, over the course of time, can bring
greater wisdom to bear on questions of morality than any other force in
society.
Thus, while the courts may fairly construe the Constitution to protect individual rights against majoritarian excesses, they should avoid
turning the Constitution into an instrument that saps the will of the
majority to pursue moral excellence through the legislative process. A
construction of the Constitution compelling the states to recognize
same-sex marriage would create precisely that kind of danger. On an
issue going to the core of the social structure, the majority would be
deprived of its decision-making power. If many such issues are withdrawn from the purview of the legislative process, the majority may
come to believe that, on questions of morality, it has lost dominant control over its own destiny. In a representative form of government, that
is not the situation in which we want to be.
C. The Impact of History and Tradition
In his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,8 6 Justice Harlan stated:

84. Id. at 191-92, (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. 'Here again, the words of Professor Jordan Paust are apt:
The actual social evils and human atrocities that we seem most concerned about . . . are
usually those that have been caused or approved by minority-elites. Such atrocities rarely
occur when the people govern as equal individual participants, although official authority
has been misused in their name in numerous social systems.
Paust, supra note 62, at 286-87. Those who are suspicious of the majority's efforts to promote
moral excellence through the legal system are under an obligation to identify some other group in
society to whom they would assign the dominant role of shaping morality in our political system.
86. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's dissent in Poe related to the
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The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers
may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are
born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and
homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into
the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this
87
area must build upon that basis.
Clearly, state laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex unions are part
of the "pattern ...pressed into the substance of our social life." It is
equally clear that such laws thus have the support of history and tradition on their side. While "history and tradition" should not be used to
immunize governmental action against constitutional attack, they
should temper the force and direction of that attack. This is especially
so in the area of substantive due process. For, as stressed by Justice
Harlan in his same Poe dissent:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot
be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept
has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one
where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on
what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a
substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.88
A Supreme Court decision compelling the states to recognize same-sex
marriage would be a decision "which radically departs" from the tradition of leaving this issue to the legislative process for resolution.
More recently, Justice Powell has urged that "[a]ppropriate limits
on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but
rather from careful 'respect from the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' "8" He warned

issue of ripeness. His position on the merits was later vindicated in Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
87. Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
88. id. at 542.
89. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Powell's approach in Moore received approving comments in Developments, The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.

1156 (1980).
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also of the "risks" which are present "when the judicial branch gives
enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights" and that such
"risks" counsel "caution and restraint" on the part of the courts.9"
The words of Harlan and Powell have particular force in relation
to the issue of same-sex marriage. As an institution "older than the Bill
of Rights," marriage in its traditional opposite-sex form has existed
throughout our nation's history. Equally long-lasting has been the tradition that confines lawful marriage to opposite-sex unions and that
leaves to the states the constitutional power to continue that confinement. Conversely, there is no traditional support in our nation's history
for the recognition of same-sex marriage or for removing this issue
from state control. In the constitutional resolution of this issue, therefore, history and tradition speak compellingly for judicial self-restraint.
In two cases, Zablocki v.Redhai 9 1 and Loving v. Virginia,9" the
Supreme Court has invalidated substantive restrictions imposed by a
state on the right to marry. But, in both such cases, the restrictions
related to opposite-sex marriage and not to same-sex marriage.93 In
Baker v. Nelson,9 4 the Supreme Court, as noted earlier,9 5 dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court upholding the power of Minnesota to restrict marriage to
heterosexual couples. The Supreme Court's own history, therefore, contains no direct decisional elements that would require the Court to
break tradition and remove the same-sex marriage issue from state control. Indeed, the Nelson dismissal action points in the direction of sustaining state control and not in the direction of abrogation.
In terms of indirect decisional elements, Supreme Court history
also supports a judical stance of self-restraint in relation to the issue of
same-sex marriage. In the area of religion, for example, the Court has
held that government may do more than it must, that government may
accommodate the free exercise of religion in situations where it is not
constitutionally obligated to do so.96 This accommodation, of course, if

90. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502.
91. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
92. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
93. In Zablocki, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that denied the right to marry to
any person who (1) has minor issue not in his custody and whom he or she is under a legal
obligation to support and (2) cannot show to the court that he or she will be able to meet that
obligation in the future. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375. In Loving, the Court invalidated Virginia's
ban on interracial marriages. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
94. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
95. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
96. Walz, 397 U.S. 664, illustrates the proposition stated in the text. In Walz, the Court
upheld a New York statute that exempted from taxation real property owned "by a corporation or
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pressed too far will result in a prohibited establishment of religion. 97
For our purposes, however, the thing to note is the Court's recognition
of an area in which the decision to accommodate is left to governmental control. By ready analogy, it would be entirely proper for the Court
to hold that a state may, at its own option, accommodate right of privacy interests by recognizing the validity of same-sex marriage. But it
is equally proper for the Court to hold that the state is not constitutionally obligated to make that accommodation. Here, as in the area of
religion, the Court should apply the principle that government may do
more than it must and should leave the issue of same-sex marriage to
the workings of legislative discretion.
D. The Threat to the Individual and Community Values Promoted
by Opposite-Sex Marriage
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function
of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. 98
Presumably, the majority would contend that legal recognition of
same-sex marriage poses a significant threat to the individual and community values promoted by marriage in its traditional opposite-sex
form. Is this fear rational? May it be reasonably entertained? If not, is
the majority then in the position of the Salem citizens who "feared
witches and burned women"? In the preceding subsections, I have argued that compelling the states to recognize same-sex marriage would
do three negative things: (1) undermine generally the values promoted
association organized exclusively for . . . religious . . . purposes . . . and used exclusively for...
such purposes." Id. at 667 n.l. The Court sustained the statute against a claim by Walz, a real
estate owner, that the "grant of an exemption to church property indirectly require[d] [him] to
make a contribution to religious bodies and thereby violate[d] provisions prohibiting establishment
of religion under the First Amendment." Id. at 667.
In sustaining the New York statute, the Walz Court reasoned that New York could properly
take into account free exercise of religion values and "the latent dangers" to such values "inherent
in the imposition of property taxes." Id. at 673. Of importance to this article, the Court then
stated that:
The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive
with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. To equate the two would
be to deny a national heritage with roots in the Revolution itself. We cannot read New
York's statute as attempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions.
Id. (citations omitted). In Walz, therefore, the Court clearly held that government may do more
than it must in accommodating free exercise of religion interests.
97. In Engel v. Vitale, 379 U.S. 41 (1962), and Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), the "school prayer" cases, the Supreme Court held that a state-initiated religious ceremony in the public schools constitutes a prohibited establishment of religion. In other
words, the Court held that government may not press accommodation of religion to that extent.
98. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 387 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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by the majority rule principle in our representative form of government; (2) undermine specifically the efforts of the majority to promote
through the legal system its own perception of moral excellence in the
area of marriage; and (3) depart radically from the teachings of history
and tradition on this issue. These arguments, however* accurate and
persuasive they may be, are not enough to carry the day unless the
majority may reasonably believe that recognition of same-sex marriage
poses a significant threat to the values promoted by opposite-sex marriage. Predictably, the analysis would not have come this far unless I
thought that such a belief was rational and that it could be reasonably
entertained by the majority.
At the outset, two things should be noted. In relation to same-sex
marriage, the majority, unlike the citizens of Salem, is not advocating
that anyone should be burned or otherwise subjected to criminal punishment. The majority is simply advocating that the issue of recognizing same-sex marriage should be left to state resolution. Secondly, the
refusal to recognize same-sex marriage pertains to a highly visible form
of relational conduct that is more than the exercise of "free speech and
assembly." 99 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has accorded to government a substantially greater latitude in the regulation of conduct than
in the regulation of speech content. 100 This conduct-content distinction,
while not a talismanic solution to all freedom of speech problems, is a
factor which, in the case of same-sex marriage, weighs in favor of judicial self-restraint.
Turning to the threat posed by the legal recognition of same-sex
marriage to the values promoted by opposite-sex marriage, I would
stress first that the marriage bond, in its traditional opposite-sex form,
"is, in our society, the main structural keystone of the kinship system." 101 Historically, "the laws regarding marriage which provide both
when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context
in which children are born and brought up" 10 2 have contributed significantly to the high and honored position that opposite-sex marriage has
always occupied in our society. That very process has enabled the marriage institution to promote more effectively the individual and commu-

99. I am not here talking about the intimate sexual conduct that lies at the core of the
relationship; presumably, that conduct remains private. I am talking instead about those aspects
of the relationship that are projected visibly and openly into daily life.
100. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949).
101. Parsons, The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States, 45 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 22, 30 (1943).
102. Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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nity values enumerated earlier. 0 3 Here, there is a strong link between
process and perception, and the perception of marriage as an institution
that is "intimate to the degree of being sacred"' 04 would be compromised by enlarging its base to include same-sex unions.
I am arguing bluntly that, in this area, exclusiveness is a virtue,
that the traditional "laws regarding marriage" have designated opposite-sex marriage, and the larger kinship system of which it is "the
main structural keystone," as the one societal institution in which intimate sexual conduct and the bearing and rearing of children are not
only tolerated but affirmatively and positively endorsed. Phrased differently, the traditional "laws regarding marriage" have made oppositesex marriage the standard of moral excellence in the core areas of sexual conduct and childrearing. As a relationship, opposite-sex marriage
thus draws nourishment from its elevated status, a status more difficult
to maintain if it must be shared with same-sex unions. The majority,
therefore, may reasonably believe that legal recognition of same-sex
marriage would destroy the exclusiveness of the present position held
by opposite-sex marriage in the eyes of society and, by so doing, would
impair the ability of opposite-sex marriage to advance the individual
and community values that it has traditionally promoted. It is perhaps
too strong a statement to say that loss of exclusiveness would trivialize
opposite-sex marriage, but that loss would, to some extent at least,
lessen the intensity of its moral appeal. And, it is the present intensity
of that appeal that operates as a spur to the full realization of the benefits that opposite-sex marriage can bring to society. 0 5

103. See supra note 8.
104. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
105. In evaluating the strength of the state's interest in criminalizing homosexual conduct,
Professors Wilkinson and White discuss "a final state concern:"
The most threatening aspect of homosexuality is its potential to become a viable alternative
to heterosexual intimacy. . . . Thus, any recognition of a constitutional right to practice
homosexuality would undermine the value of heterosexuality and the institutions and practices-conventional marriage and childbearing-associated with it.
This state concern, in our view, should not be minimized ....
Family life has been a
central unifying experience throughout American society. Preserving the strength of this
basic, organic unit is a central and legitimate end of the police power. The state ought to
be concerned that if allegiance to traditional family arrangements declines, society as a
whole may well suffer.
...
A shift on the part of the law from opposition to neutrality arguably makes homosexuality appear a more acceptable sexual lifestyle, particularly to younger persons whose
sexual preferences are as yet unformed ....
If homosexual behavior is legalized, and thus
partly legitimized, an adolescent may question whether he or she should "choose" heterosexuality.... If society accorded more legitimacy to expressions of homosexual attraction,
attachment to the opposite sex might be postponed or diverted for some time . . . . For
those persons who eventually choose the heterosexual model, the existence of conflicting
models might provide further sexual tension destructive to the traditional marital unit.
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The majority's concern may reasonably extend beyond a concern
for the loss of exclusiveness. This broader concern relates to what I
have called the "linchpin" nature of the same-sex marriage issue. As
described earlier, the legal recognition of same-sex marriage would produce major social and legal consequences. 10 6 Socially, the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is the secular equivalent of the church's liturgical blessing of same-sex unions. It is a highly visible act that
enables the same-sex couple to project their relationship into the daily
walks of public life in substantially the same manner as the oppositesex couple. Legally, the state's recognition of same-sex marriage leads
irresistibly to a constitutional position that precludes any difference in
the legal regulation of same-sex and opposite-sex conduct in any area
of human endeavor. This principle of "total equality" would have particular relevance in proceedings concerning adoption and child custody.
For, if the courts compel the states to recognize same-sex marriage, it
becomes difficult indeed to justify any law that prohibits a married homosexual couple from doing what a married heterosexual couple is permitted to do or, more generally, any law that discriminates between the
two kinds of married couples in defining their legal rights. The governmental interest that supports such discrimination would disappear with
107
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
What impact would these major social and legal consequences
have upon the ability of opposite-sex marriage to advance the values it
has traditionally promoted? It is, of course, impossible to know in advance of the event. This is all the more reason for not locking the states
constitutionally into a position from which they cannot withdraw. If the
issue of same-sex marriage is left to state resolution, a state may, at its
option, choose to recognize same-sex marriage. This legislative action,
if it proves harmful to society, may be modified or revoked. If the issue
of same-sex marriage is removed constitutionally from state control,
this power of legislative experimentation likewise disappears. Moreover,
if the constitutional mandate produces harmful consequences to society,

Wilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563,
595-96 (1977). While Wilkinson and White were addressing the issue of state power to make
homosexual conduct a crime, their words are particularly persuasive when applied to the same-sex
marriage issue.
106. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
107. In Comment, supra note 14, the authors conclude that "[h]omosexual couples should.
. . be afforded the opportunity to obtain the legal status and marital benefits to which they are
entitled." Id. at 213. On the question, however, of the right of homosexuals to adopt, they concede
that "[c]hildren growing up in homosexual environments frequently incur a great deal of ridicule
from their peers." Id. at 214-15. Accordingly, the authors conclude that a "legislature may legitimately find that, absent a biological relationship to one member of the homosexual union, children
ordinarily should not suffer such needless emotional trauma." Id. at 215.
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the states will have lost their power to legislate a remedy and must
ultimately apply to the Supreme Court (or the amendment process) for
relief.
More fundamentally, state legislatures, in reflecting the majority
will, are under no constitutional obligation to prove empirically that
legal recognition of same-sex marriage would impair the ability of opposite-sex marriage to advance the values it has traditionally promoted.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 08
a case involving state regulation of obscenity: "From the beginning of
civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions."1 0 9 If the current "laws regarding marriage" constitute a "pattern . . . deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life," ' a legislature might reasonably conclude that a major alteration
of that pattern could affect negatively the pattern's ability to benefit
society as it has in the past, that this major alteration would create a
significant risk of negative impact that the legislature does not wish
society to incur. " "Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from
reaching such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because
there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data" to support the
12
conclusion.i
Admittedly, the Paris Court's remarks concerning empirical data
were made in a case involving the showing of obscenity to consenting
adults in a public theater. And, in stating that "[i]t is not for us to
resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation," the Court
reserved "the exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges
upon rights protected by the Constitution itself."' 1 3 The right of privacy is a fundamental right "protected by the Constitution," and this
article has conceded that nonrecognition of same-sex marriage does impinge upon that right if expanded generally to include sexual conduct

108. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
109. Id. at 61. In the obscenity context of Paris, the Court added: "Although there is no
conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature
of Georgia could reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist." Id. at 60-61.
110. Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Ill. See supra note105, for excerpts from the extensive comments of Professors Wilkinson
and White on this point. As noted there, Wilkinson and White are discussing the "negative impact" problem in the context of decriminalizing homosexual conduct. Their remarks apply, with
perhaps even greater force, to the negative impact flowing from the recognition of same-sex
marriage.
112. Paris, 413 U.S. at 63. In the obscenity context of Paris, the conclusion referred to by
the Court was that "[tihe sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an
ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased
and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex." Id. at 63.
113. Id. at 60.
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between consenting adults in private.11 4 This should not make the Paris
Court's remarks concerning empirical data inapposite to the issue of
same-sex marriage. It does mean that, under the assumptions of this
article, those remarks must be applied in the context of the strict scrutiny doctrine that is triggered when state legislation impinges on a fundamental right. Even at that level of judicial review, the Supreme
Court has never held that the "compelling" nature of the interest that
government is seeking to advance or the "least drastic" nature of the
means it employs must be conclusively demonstrated by empirical data.
Clearly, on both of the prongs of strict scrutiny review, the government's supporting rationale should be probed more searchingly than in
those cases where a lower level of judicial review is applied. That rationale, however, should not be discarded because it relies primarily on
arguments for which conclusive empirical data are lacking.115 Especially is this so in those instances where the relevant empirical data for
testing the validity of the government's rationale will become available
only through making the legislative change that government is resisting. Government should not be required to yield its position in advance for the main purpose of creating the empirical data that may
only tend to show why government should not have yielded in the first
place. Unprovable assumptions have their own legitimate role to play in
advancing the "compelling" interests of society.
E. Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage as a "Narrowly Drawn"
Means

Under strict scrutiny review, the means employed by government
to advance its "compelling" interest must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake,"116 or, as is often said,
must be the least drastic means available to government for achieving
11 7
its interests. As stated by Justice Stewart in Shelton v. Tucker:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be

114. See supra text accompanying note 9.
115. I would argue that a standard of "reasonableness" is implicit in the application of the
two prongs of strict scrutiny review. In determining whether a governmental end is "compelling"
or a governmental means "narrowly drawn," a court is really asking whether it is reasonable to
conclude that the end is compelling or the means narrowly drawn. The presence or absence of the
strict scrutiny elements are, in this view, determined from the perspective of a reasonable person.
There is room in that perspective for conclusions not absolutely supported by empirical data and
even for conclusions based on inherently unprovable assumptions. How, for example, do we prove
empirically that vigilant protection of the right of free speech is essential to the preservation of a
representative form of government in which the majority will principle is the dominant norm?
116. Roe v. Wade,410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
117. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. " 8
This article has assumed that government does have a "compelling"
interest in protecting and fostering the institution of marriage" and
that the right of privacy, a "fundamental" right, does include the decision of one adult to engage privately in sexual conduct with another
consenting adult.120 In addition, this article has conceded that nonrecognition of same-sex marriage does limit the right of privacy as so construed.' 2 ' Accordingly, attention must now focus on nonrecognition of
same-sex marriage as a means in relation both to the governmental end
pursued and the individual right affected.
In relation to the governmental end pursued, that of protecting
and fostering the institution of marriage, the nonrecognition of samesex marriage is a "narrowly drawn" means. If recognition of same-sex
marriage poses a significant threat to the values traditionally promoted
by opposite-sex marriage, and I have argued that it does, then, nonrecognition of same-sex marriage is a means narrowly drawn to prevent
that threat from arising; it has a tight and highly logical tie to the end
that government is seeking to advance. Indeed, if the threat posed by
the recognition of same-sex marriage is real, it is hard to imagine how
any means short of nonrecognition could block that threat. Here, nonrecognition as a means is not only narrowly drawn in relation to the
governmental end pursued, it may well be indispensable to the achievement of that end.' 22
Further support for nonrecognition of same-sex marriage as a permissible means comes from an examination of that means in relation to
its impact on the right of privacy. If the right of privacy includes the
decision of one adult to engage privately in sexual conduct with another
consenting adult, nonrecognition of same-sex marriage does impinge on
that right as exercised by homosexual couples seeking to establish a
permanent relationship. Among other things, nonrecognition of samesex marriage deprives such couples of the material, emotional, and psychological benefits that legal recognition of their relationship would
bring. 12 3 The impact of nonrecognition, therefore, is not slight.
118. Id. at 488.
119. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
123. As stressed by Professor Karst:
The homosexual couple who wish to enter a formal marriage will not be looking for mate-
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If not slight, the impact of nonrecognition is no more "gouging"
than it has to be to enable government to achieve its goal of protecting
and fostering the institution of marriage in its traditional opposite-sex
form. More precisely, nonrecognition of same-sex marriage is the "least
drastic" means of advancing that goal. As a means, nonrecognition of
same-sex marriage involves no criminal prosecution or regulation of
same-sex conduct. It involves simply the legal system's refusal to give
an affirmative endorsement to such conduct within the framework of a
permanent relationship. Moreover, nonrecognition of same-sex marriage does not impair the legal capacity of persons engaging in samesex conduct to enter into contractual and donative transactions with
and for each other. Recent state court decisions12 indicate a judicial
willingness to enforce, as valid contracts, agreements pertaining to the
acquisition, division, and distribution of property that are entered into
between unmarried persons who are living together. Presumably, this
judicial willingness extends also to the enforcement of gifts and wills
duly made or executed by such persons in which they give or devise
property to each other. Nonrecognition of same-sex marriage thus affects the same-sex couple no more severely than is necessary in relation
to the end that government is seeking to achieve. No means that is less
drastic in its impact comes readily to mind. Between the choices of
nonrecognition and recognition, there exists no intermediate option.
V.

CONCLUSION

The arguments advanced in this article should have particular
force in determining whether the courts should impose on the states a
constitutional obligation to recognize same-sex marriage. It is one thing
for a state, acting voluntarily through its own legislative process, to
recognize same-sex marriage. Here, at least, the values promoted by
the majority rule principle are not impaired and the majority is, by
definition, pursuing its own perception of moral excellence through the
legal system. It is quite another thing for the courts to remove this
issue from state control. That judicial action would impair the values
promoted by the majority rule principle and would prevent the majority
from pursuing its own perception of moral excellence through the legislature. This reality, coupled with the empirical uncertainties that admittedly surround the same-sex marriage issue, should warn the courts

rial benefits, or even for the pleasure of each other's company (which they already have),
so much as for the opportunity to say something about who they are and to obtain community recognition of their relationship.
Karst, supra note 9, at 651.
124. The most notable example of these recent decisions is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d
660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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to move slowly. For, when the wisdom of judicial intervention is in serious doubt and the consequences of that intervention are major in their
impact on the traditional fabric of society, the courts should err on the
side of judicial restraint. Like adjudication, wise judicial intervention
"has its own time for ripening."1 5 In the case of same-sex marriage,
that time has not arrived.

125. The quoted phrase is from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
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